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SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE: YOU CAN'T
HAVE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER:
A RECOMMENDATION FOR MODEL RULE 7.3
I. INTRODUCTION

A woman arrives at a courthouse with her son. She speaks little
to no English and is a bit overwhelmed by her surroundings. All that
she knows is that her son has been arrested, and she must appear before a judge somewhere in the building. People brush by her, rushing to make their own respective court appearances. Mr. Solomon
Cohn, an attorney, happens to notice her as he walks by. Cohn asks
her if she needs assistance, to which she replies, "Yes." After she
explains her situation to him, Cohn guides her to the proper courtroom and offers to represent her son's interests.'
While some might view this encounter as a philanthropic or
gratuitous gesture, the Supreme Court of New York held otherwise.2
The court convicted Cohn of the crime of solicitation of business on
behalf of an attorney and sentenced him to an unconditional discharge. In discussing this case, ethicist Monroe Freedman strongly
disagreed with the court's holding.4 He instead proclaimed that
5
Cohn "should have been given a citation as 'Attorney of the Year.'
For most people, the term "attorney solicitation" conjures up
stereotypical images of "ambulance chasing" attorneys who prey on
bed-ridden accident victims. 6 Whether the solicitation occurs in the
1. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 118 (1975) (citing in re Cohn, 352 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1974)).
2. See Cohn, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 462.

3. See id.
4. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1,at 118.
5. Id.; see also Louise L. Hill, SolicitationBy Lawyers: Piercing the First

Amendment Veil, 42 ME. L. REv. 369, 416 (1990) (discussing Freedman's

characterization of attorney Solomon Cohn).

6. See John H. Wilbur, Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7
VAND. L. REv. 677, 684 (1954); Joe Wishcamper, Comment, Benign Solicita-
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personal injury context, 7 or simply through the practice of "giving
unsolicited legal advice. . . [and accepting] ... employment resulting from such advice," 8 both the United States Supreme Court and
the American Bar Association ("ABA") condemn this practice.
Based on the belief that the primary source of the "substantive
evils" 9 inherent in attorney solicitation is the prospect of pecuniary
gain,' 0 the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3

prohibits almost all attorney solicitation motivated by a pecuniary
interest.1 Freedman's commendation of the attorney engaged in solicitation in the previous scenario, however, suggests that the permissibility of such conduct should not rise or fall based on subjective
motive alone. In fact, Freedman implies that, even if a court exam-

ined a subjective factor such as an attorney's motive, it would also
need to consider objective aspects of the solicitation. These include
the nature of the attorney's actions
and the circumstances under
2
which the solicitation took place.'
As it stands today, Model Rule 7.3, which regulates and proscribes attorney solicitation, employs only a subjective analysis in
ascertaining the permissibility of an attorney's conduct.' 3 Model
tion of Clients by Attorneys, 54 WASH. L. REv. 671, 671 (1979); see, e.g.,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 469 (1978) (concerning attorney Albert Ohrali, who engaged in "ambulance chasing" when he solicited
two automobile accident victims).
7. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449; see also Attorney Grievance Comm' n v.
Gregory, 536 A.2d 646 (Md. 1988) (addressing solicitation in the criminal
context).
8. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 458.
9. See id. at461.
10. See Victor P. Filippini, Jr., Soliciting Sophisticates:A Modest Proposal
for Attorney Solicitation, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 590 n.34 (1982); see
also Evan R. Levy, Edenfield v. Fane: In-Person Solicitation by Professionals
Revisited-What Makes Lawyers Different?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 261, 280 n.140
(1994) (identifying the stirring up of litigation and assertion of fraudulent
claims as additional evils plaguing attorney solicitation).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) (1998).
But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(b) (1998) (permitting the in-person solicitation of clients with whom an attorney had a prior
professional relationship, or who are family members).
12. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 119.
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998) ("A
lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client... when a significant motive for the law-
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Rule 7.3's legislative history indicates that the ABA instituted a
purely subjective analysis because of its reading of the United States
Supreme Court's holdings in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n14 and
In re Primus.' 5 These cases held in part that the evils associated with
16
solicitation were attributable to an attorney's pecuniary motive.
Accordingly, the Court refused to afford First Amendment protection
to attorney solicitation, and effectively prohibited all pecuniarymotivated attorney solicitations.' 7 Based on its interpretation of the
Court's holding, the ABA promulgated an ethical rule containing a
subjective test proscribing attorney solicitation based solely on the
soliciting attorney's subjective motive.1 8
If the ABA sought to accurately codify the Supreme Court's approach, however, the language of Model Rule 7.3 is oversimplified.
As Freedman suggests, the Court's treatment of attorney solicitation
should not-and does not-rest on purely subjective criteria. 19 Indeed, the Court's analysis of the respective solicitations in both
Ohralik and Primus contain both subjective and objective components. In fact, both Justice Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik2° and
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in In re Primus2 1 emphasized, to varying
degrees, the need for an objective element in assessing the permissibility of attorney solicitations.
Ironically, over a decade later in Edenfield v. Fane,22 the Court
relied solely on an objective analysis when it distinguished the impermissibility of pecuniary-motivated attorney solicitations from
In Edenfield, the Court struck
those of accountant solicitations.
down a statute that prohibited accountants from engaging in
yer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.").
14. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
15. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
16. See id. at 422; Ohralik,436 U.S. at 464.
17. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at456.
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998); see
also infra Part IV.
19. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1,at 118.
20. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).

21. See Primus,436 U.S. at 440-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
23. See id. at 775-76.
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commercial solicitation when their motive for doing so was purely
Eefedo
pecuniary. 24 The Edenfield
Court's emphasis on objective criteria,
such as the nature of the profession and the circumstances surrounding the solicitation, reflected the need to incorporate an objective
component into the language of Model Rule 7.3. Therefore, as the
ABA's Ethics 2000 Committee on the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct convenes this fall2 5 to reevaluate Model Rule
7.3, the Committee should revise the solicitation rule to reflect an
analysis with both a subjective and an objective component. Not
only will the inclusion of an objective factor produce a rule that mirrors that of the Supreme Court, but it will also better serve public interest and public policy concerns.
This Comment posits that, in amending Model Rule 7.3, the
ABA Ethics 2000 Committee should adopt a two-prong subjectiveobjective analysis to determine when attorney solicitations are permissible. Part II discusses the history of attorney solicitation, how it
acquired its poor reputation, and why the fears surrounding it require
both subjective and objective criteria to adequately gauge its peril.
Part III examines Model Rule 7.3's pecuniary motive language and
critiques it in light of the legislative history and the rationale behind
its adoption. Part IV explores the United States Supreme Court's
treatment of attorney solicitation and its analysis containing both
subjective and objective criteria in evaluating the propriety of attorney solicitations. Part IV demonstrates how the Court's reliance on
objective factors in effectively upholding a pecuniary-motivated accountant solicitation in Edenfield necessitates the addition of an objective component to Model Rule 7.3. Part V analyzes the public
policy rationales that expose the weaknesses of a purely subjective
test, thereby demonstrating the need for an objective analysis. Part
VI concludes that a test encompassing both a subjective and an objective component not only codifies the desires expressed by Justices
Marshall and Rehnquist's minority opinions, but helps restore accountability to a legal system that will continue to anonymously
24. See id. at 777.
25. For more information on the ABA Ethics 2000 Committee and the redrafting of the Model Rules, see American Bar Association, Centerfor Professional Responsibility (visited May 21, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
ethics2k.html>.
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victimize pro se litigants so long as a purely subjective solicitation
rule exists.
II. REPLETE WITH A REPUTATION: ATTORNEY SOuCITATION AND ITS
HISTORY

Attorney solicitation, frequently derided as "ambulance chasup pejorative, stereotypical images of attorneys who

ing,''26 conjures

coerce bed-ridden accident victims into retaining them as counsel to

sue for their personal injuries. While not limited to the personal injury context,27 almost all attorney solicitation activity has been condemned by the United States Supreme Court2 8 because of a wellestablished fear of the "substantive evils" 29 inherent in and perpetuated by such activity. 0 This fear clearly stems from the long history

of ill-repute associated with attorney solicitation.
Solicitation traces its roots, and its pejorative reputation, back to
ancient Greek and Roman times. Society had viewed attorneys who

actively sought out clients with skepticism and suspicion 3' because
of the way they sought to interfere in litigation proceedings. Appropriately called "intervenors" 32 in Greek society, these attorneys often

took advantage of the limited privileges they had to intervene on behalf of others and were frequently charged with abusing the legal

26. See Wilbur, supra note 6, at 684; see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (illustrating a classic example of an attorney engaged in "ambulance chasing").
27. See Wilbur, supra note 6, at 684-85. See generally Wishcamper, supra
note 6, at 675 (contrasting "ambulance chasing" with benign forms of solicitation).
28. But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422 (carving out an exception to the
otherwise prophylactic ban on attorney solicitation for non-pecuniary solicitations that seek to preserve civil and political rights).
29. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at461.
30. See Filippini, supra note 10, at 590 n.34; see also Levy, supra note 10,
at 280 n.140 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461 (explaining that such evils include "stirring up litigation, assert[ing] fraudulent claims, debasing the legal
profession, and [inflicting] potential harm to the solicited client in the form of
overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation")).
31. See Hill, supra note 5,at370 & n.13.
32. Id. at 372-73.
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process.
They were regarded as "sycophants," or "individual[s]
who voluntarily undertook the prosecution of a matter, being motivated by money, prestige, [and] political advantage, '34 or who did so
purely to harass their opponents. This aura of distrust that emerged
in Greek society carried over into Roman times. 36 Even where advocacy was a recognized profession, 37 Roman attorneys, or "calumniators,

' 38

also vexatiously litigated frivolous or baseless actions on be-

half of litigants.3 9 This conduct fueled society's continued distrust of
advocates' involvement in the legal system.

Even when the practice of obtaining legal representation carried
over into the English legal tradition,40 it was still accompanied not
only by the same "ancient prejudice against representation, but also
[by] ... the perception that these advocates encouraged... profitseeking lawsuits in particular."' 4' English advocates, or "champi-

ons," 42 unsurprisingly developed reputations for being dishonest,
greedy individuals who, much like their predecessors, were motivated purely by their own financial interests. 43 Champions were
said to perpetuate

and promote barratry, 44 champerty, 45 and

33. See id. at 372-73 & nn.23-26.

34. Id. at 371.
35. See id. at 372 & n.23.
36. See id. at372.
37. See id. at 373.
38. Id.
39. See id. For a more thorough discussion of the historical treatment of
attorney solicitation, see HENRY SANDWITH DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953)
and MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAw (1986).
40. See Hill, supra note 5, at 374.

41. Id. at 375.
42. Id. at 370.
43. See id. at 375.
44. Black's Law Dictionary defines "barratry" as "[t]he offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 150 (6th ed. 1990); see also Robert E. Gipson,
Comment, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal
CounselAvailable, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1181-82 & 1182 n.6 (1972) (comparing
the prohibition of solicitation to "historical animus against 'stirring up litigation' and to the prevention of barratry, champerty and maintenance... ").
45. Black's Law Dictionary defines "champerty" as a "bargain between a
stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's

claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds;... one type
of 'maintenance. . . ."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990); see
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maintenance. 46 Hence, the English legal system traditionally discouraged its attorneys from soliciting business.47
In modeling its legal system after the English, the proponents of
the American legal system acquired the same distaste for attorney
solicitations.48 In fact, the American Bar Association's unfavorable
view of solicitation prompted it to enact the Canons of Ethics in
1908. 4 9 The original Canons codified a solicitation prohibition, denouncing attorney solicitation as "unprofessional" behavior.5 °
However, with respect to the rules proscribing solicitation, the
ethical canons were regarded as ineffective. 5 ' Much of their failure
was attributable to the ABA's use of vague and ambiguous language, 2and the overall failure of the Canons to properly govern attorney conduct.5 3 The need for more decisive language and finite
standards5 4 forced drafters of the Canons, and later the Model Code
also Gipson, supra note 44, at 1182 n.6 (explaining the meaning and historical
significance of champerty).

46. Black's Law Dictionary defines "maintenance" with respect to lawsuits
as "[a]n officious intermeddling in a lawsuit ... or assisting either party, with
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litigation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990); see also Gipson, supra note 44, at 1182 n.6
(explaining the meaning and historical significance of maintenance).
47. See Hill, supra note 5, at 375 n.51.
48. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977). Bates
explained that the ban on attorney advertising and commercial speech first
originated as a rule of etiquette in the legal profession. See id. The English
viewed commercial speech as being affiliated with "trades," which differed
from the view that a law practice was an esteemed form of public service. See
also, e.g., DRINKER, supra note 39, at 210-12 (discussing the historical treatment of attorney solicitation). Note also that one functional and contemporary
equivalent of an American "lawyer," ironically enough, is an English "solicitor." See Hill, supra note 5, at 377 & n.60.
49. See Gipson, supra note 44, at 1182. See generallyDRINKER, supra note
39, at 23-25 (providing additional historical background on the evolution of
American legal ethics).
50. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908). The original
wording of the Canon states that the "solicitation of business by... personal
communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." Id.
51. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 127.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. The ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards
sought to revise the Canons for three main reasons: first, the Canons failed to
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of Professional Responsibility,55 to pinpoint the precise solicitous
conduct the Committee sought to proscribe. In doing so, the Committee could better draft a rule proscribing attorney solicitation that
would effectively assuage any fears associated with such ill-reputed
conduct.
The drafters identified seven concerns that an ethics rule governing solicitation should address. First, the rules should seek to
protect potential clients from "deception, overreaching, undue influence, intimidation, and misrepresentation" by attorneys who may coerce them into retaining the attorney's services. 56 Second, the rules
should shield clients from situations where an attorney's undue influence could force them into making uninformed and impromptu
decisions.17 Specifically, the drafters believed that face-to-face contact is "offensive to the sensibilities of a client"5' and invasive of
one's privacy. 59 Moreover, such direct contact with a client fails to
address important areas of attorney conduct; second, they failed to offer guidelines as to practical sanctions for behavior; and third, they proved incapable of
addressing the changing conditions in both the legal system and society at
large. See id. at 129. Hence, the Committee formulated a revised set of guidelines, namely the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which replaced
the Canons in 1969. Model Code DR 2-104 replaced Canon 27 as the rule
governing attorney solicitation. It stated, subject to limited exceptions, that "a
lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice.. . ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-104 (1983).
55. In 1984, the ABA replaced the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility with the ModelRules ofProfessionalConduct. The ABA felt that Model

Code DR 2-104 was too restrictive. See Lori B. Andrews, The Model Rules
and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808, 811 (1982) (discussing features of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 which improved and more
clearly defined the scope of attorney solicitation).
56. Filippini, supra note 10, at 590 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-4 (1983) (stating that a "lawyer who volunteers in-

person advice that one should obtain the services of a lawyer generally should
not himself accept employment; compensation, or other benefit in connection
with that matter").
57. See Comment A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation By
Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 674, 683 (1958).
58. Id.

59. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951) (upholding a
municipal ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door solicitation of magazine sub-
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give the client an opportunity to compare the quality of the soliciting
attorney's services, prices, and qualifications with those of others not
before the client. 60 Without this opportunity to interview and research various attorneys, clients are denied the critical opportunity to
make an informed choice regarding which attorney is capable of best
representing their interests.6 '
Third, the rules should work toward eliminating the fear that inperson solicitations will "stir up litigation,' , 62 and flood the courts
with lawsuits. 63 Fourth, the rules should address the fear that an attorney may subordinate a client's best interest to that of an attorney's
own pecuniary interest if and when the two conflict. 64 Indeed, solicitation might arguably increase fraudulent claims because a soliciting attorney not only "suggests to the claimant the possibility of asserting a . . .claim, but also assures
[the claimant] of professional
65
support in prosecuting [the] suit.
The fifth concern expressed a belief that the ethics rules governing solicitation should preserve the standards, reputation, and integrity of the legal profession. 66 This rationale derives from a fear
67
that "disrespect for lawyers leads to a disrespect for [the] law."
Sixth, the rules should aim "at maintaining the self-perceived
status of lawyers., 68 This concern stemmed from the notion of
scriptions because such activity constituted an invasion of privacy).
60. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 457-58.
61. See id.
62. Comment, supra note 57, at 675.
63. See generally id. (discussing the implications of stirring up litigation).
64. See Filippini, supra note 10, at 590 n.34. But see Charles A. Pulaski,
Jr., In-Person Solicitation and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly
Decided?, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 23, 55-60 (1979) (arguing that an attorney's
better judgment can be equally blurred by political motivations).
65. Comment, supra note 57, at 679 (paraphrasing Report of the Committee
of Censors,PhiladelphiaBarAss'n, 14 MAss.L.Q. Supp. 44, 59 (1928)).
66. See Filippini, supra note 10, at 591 (ascertaining that in-person solicitations are not per se undignified). Filippini argued that if an attorney solicits in
a discrete, tactful, and non-coercive manner, such behavior could arguably restore a sense of professionalism to the legal profession. See id.
67. Comment, supra note 57, at 681. The article also contemplates the argument "that solicitation works to the detriment of the legal profession by concentrating legal business in the hands of a few lawyers." Id. at 682.
68. Filippini, supra note 10, at 591-92.
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'professional hubris"; 69 since attorneys are members of an esteemed
and "learned profession [that] perform[s] a public service, 70 they
should "avoid the commercialism of ordinary trades and businesses." 7' Lastly, a solicitation rule should decrease competition 72
in
stealing.
"client
prevent
and
harmony,
promote
the profession,
With these concerns in mind, the ABA sought to revamp the Model
Code and its solicitation canon, and formulate a rule which would
eradicate the evils of attorney solicitation.
Ill. ThE DEVELOPMENT OF AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND

MODEL RULE 7.3

After considering the foregoing fears and concerns, the ABA
drafted the Model Code solicitation provisions to serve as an outright
ban on all solicitation activity. 73 The ABA believed that an outright
69. Id. at 592.
70. Id.

71. Id. (paraphrasing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977)).
72. Id. Filippini infers this from his reading of the Model Code of Professional Conduct EC 2-3, EC 2-4, DR 2-103 &DR 2-104. See id. at 592 n.44.
73. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (A)
(1983) (stating that "a lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a
layperson that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept
employment resulting from that advice... "); see also Hill, supra note 5, at
382 ("In a blanket provision, the Canons asserted that solicitation of business
by ...personal communications, or interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-4 (1983) ("A lawyer who volunteers in-person advice that one should
obtain the services of a lawyer generally should not himself accept employment, compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter.").

The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and the Model Rules of

ProfessionalConduct have in fact permitted only a few exceptions to the otherwise blanket ban on in-person attorney solicitation. The Model Code and the
Model Rules do permit the in-person solicitation of business from a friend or
family member, where a personal relationship existed between the attorney and
the client prior to a legal employment relationship, or where the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the lawyer's pecuniary gain. See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) & EC 2-4 (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) & cmt.(4) (1998).
Another exception is one carved out for pro bono organizations and other legal
aid services. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2104(A)(2)&(3) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
7.3(d) & cmt.(4)&(6) (1998). Furthermore, the Model Code permits employment resulting from the offering of unsolicited advice to a close friend,
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ban was necessary in order to abolish the peril and harm that invaria-

bly infected every in-person attorney solicitation. The ban, characterized as a "prophylactic" measure,74 sought to shield lay people
from any danger resulting from such an encounter.75
However, the ABA drafters of the Model Code provisions were
forced to reconsider the outright ban on solicitation 76 when the
United States Supreme Court handed down their decisions in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass '77 and In re PriMus.78 These opinions elucidated the fact that "there might be some instances in which in-person

contact by a lawyer may produce fewer dangers[,] or even be in the
potential clients' best interest. 79 In formulating a rule proscribing
in-person solicitation, the ABA looked to the Supreme Court for
guidance in developing one that clarified an attorney's role, and provided a restrictive, yet constitutional framework to guide the ethical
practice of law.80 The product of the ABA's revision of the existing
Model Code provision was the codification of a modified set of ethics rules known as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' Indeed, the legislative history of Model Rule 7.3 clearly indicates that
whereas the Model Rules only permit solicitations of a friend where there has
been a prior professional or personal relationship. Compare MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (A)(1) & EC 2-4 (1983) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a) & cmt.(4) (1998) (illustrating the distinction between the Model Code and Model Rules on this
point).
74. See Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,464 (1978).
75. Note that both the Model Code and the Model Rules allow for exceptions to the otherwise "outrighf' ban on in-person solicitation. See supra note
73 and accompanying text.
76. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 & EC
2-4 (1983).
77. '436 U.S. at 468.
78. 436 U.S. at438-39.
79. Andrews, supranote 55, at 811.
80. See ELAINE REICH, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

182-83 (1987).

81. While both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code
of ProfessionalResponsibility are in effect today, the majority of jurisdictions
adhere to the Model Rules. In comparing the language of Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct Rule 7.3 with Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility
DR 2-104(A)(1)-(3), which banned virtually all employment resulting from a
solicitation, it is clear that ModelRule 7.3 allows more latitude. See supra note
73 and accompanying text.
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the rule parallels the precise language and approach used by the Supreme Court in its treatment of a pecuniary-motivated attorney solicitation in Ohralik.82 Accordingly, Model Rule 7.3 reads as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact

solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional
relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from
a prospective client by written or recorded communication
or by in-person or telephone contact even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if: ...3(2) the solicitation
involves coercion, duress or harassment.8
As the language of Model Rule 7.3 indicates, the ABA interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Ohralik to signify that the
"evil [in solicitation activity] was thought likely to occur when a

82. The Drafting Committee actually rejected an earlier version of the rule
which did not contain the pecuniary motive language from the Ohralik opinion. The earlier version read:
(a) A lawyer may initiate personal contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining professional employment only in the following circumstances and subject to the requirements of paragraph (b):
(1) if the prospective client is a close friend, relative, former client or
one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client; (2) under the
auspices of a public or charitable legal services organization; or; (3)
under the auspices of a bona fide political, social, civic, fraternal, employee or trade organization whose purposes include but are not limited to providing or recommending legal services, if the legal services
are related to the principal purposes of the organization.
(b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to, a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if. (1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer; (2)
the person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to receive communications from the lawyer; or (3) the communication involves coercion, duress or harassment.
REICH, supra note 80, at 182-83.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998) (emphasis
added).
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lawyer significantly motivated by pecuniary gain privately solicited
employment. ' 4 Therefore, the ABA implemented a solicitation ban
which employed the attorney's subjective pecuniary motive as a
gauge for improper conduct. Based on its reading of Ohralik, the
ABA believed that "there [was] far less likelihood that a lawyer
would engage in abusive practices against an individual ...

where

the lawyer [was]' motivated
by considerations other than the lawyer's
5
pecuniary gain. 8
In codifying a purely subjective test, however, the ABA failed to
exactly mirror the Supreme Court's analysis of attorney solicitations.
Rather, upon close examination of the Court's opinions in both
Ohralik and Primus, and later in Edenfield,8 6 one observes that the
Court actually employed both objective and subjective factors in its
analysis of attorney solicitation. Moreover, the Court recognized
that while it was important to assess the soliciting attorney's subjective motives, objective factors--such as the circumstances under
which the solicitation took place--should also be considered in ascertaining the permissibility of a solicitation. 87 By including objective factors in its analysis, the Court could obtain a more precise idea
of exactly what transpired during the solicitation encounter. Therefore, to best reflect the Supreme Court's approach, the ABA Ethics
2000 Committee should redraft Model Rule 7.3 to include both an
objective and subjective analysis.
IV. ATORNEY SoLIcrrATION ANALYZED: THE SUPREME COURT'S

Two-STEP APPROACH

A. CommercialSpeech and Solicitation: A Foreshadowingof Sorts

Even before the Supreme Court addressed solicitation in the
context of the legal profession, its treatment of other forms of commercial speech foreshadowed its future conclusions about attorney
84. REICH, supra note 80, at 183-84.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 cmt.(4) (1998)
(emphasis added).

86. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
87. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464; Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-35, 442-44
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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solicitation. Traditionally, commercial speech had gone unprotected.
The Court, however, finally afforded limited constitutional protection to commercial speech, or speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction,, 88 when it carved out an entirely new
area of constitutionally protected speech 89 in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,Inc.90 There, the

Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prevented a pharmacist from
advertising prices of prescription drugs. 9 1 In employing a balancing

test, the Court found that the interests of free enterprise and the free
flow of commercial information outweighed the state's interest in
"maintaining ' a92high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed

pharmacists.

In seeking to preserve those interests, however, the Court did
not grant absolute protection to all forms of commercial speech. In
fact, the Court specifically limited the holding of Virginia Board of
Pharmacyto its facts, and refused to extend its rationale to other professions, let alone attorney commercial speech. 93 Rather, in the case
of professional solicitations conducted by professionals, the Court
would "require consideration of quite different factors [since] ...
lawyers ...

render professional services of almost infinite variety

and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion
and deception . . . .

This statement is significant because it

88. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). For more background on the commercial speech doctrine, see Fred S. McChesney, Commer-

cial Speech In the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions
and QuestionableAnswers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1985) and Judith L. Maute,
Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech andAntitrustDoctrine,13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1986).
89. See Levy, supra note 10, at 261-62.
90. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Commercial speech traveled a long, complex
road before finally receiving limited constitutional protection. For a chronology and explanation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, see Jeffrey M.
Brandt, Attorney In-Person Solicitation: Hope for a New Direction and Supreme Court ProtectionAfter Edenfield v. Fane, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 783, 786
n.27 (1994).
91. See Virginia Bd. ofPharmacy,425 U.S. at 749-50.
92. Id. at 766.
93. See id. at 773 n.25.
94. Id.
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demonstrates that the Court regarded professional solicitation-specifically that of attorneys-as distinct from other forms of commercial speech. In dicta, moreover, the Court indicated that the very
nature of professional solicitations required the consideration of different factors when analyzing and evaluating professional solicitation
cases. 95 This insight into the Court's jurisprudence proved to be
quite instrumental in examining the Court's eventual treatment of
attorney solicitation cases.
B. Leaving the BalancingBehind: The Supreme Court's
Employment of a Two-Prong, Subjective and Objective Analysis of
Attorney Solicitation
1. The two prongs revealed
Although the Court alluded to attorney solicitation in other
commercial speech cases, 96 the Supreme Court finally directly

95. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977). In Bates, the
Supreme Court heard a case involving an advertisement for legal services that
two young attorneys placed in a local newspaper. See id. at 354. The Court
struck down a ban prohibiting attorney advertising on the grounds that while a
state may proscribe false and misleading attorney advertising, it can not impose a blanket ban, as such a prohibition was unconstitutional. See id. at 38384. The Court was careful to limit the Bates holding to its facts, and thereby
dispelled any hope of applying it to attorney in-person solicitations. See id. at
366. The Court condemned the "in-person solicitation of clients--at the hospital room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds undue influence... [because it] ... might well pose dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation not encountered in ... advertising." Id. at 366. While the

Court's dicta did not proscribe it completely, the Court implied that, by virtue
of the dangers solicitation possessed that advertising lacked, the Court would
not afford attorney solicitation the same constitutional protection afforded to
attorney advertising. See id. at 366, 383-84; see also Paul S. Manning, Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association: Do Bans on In-PersonSolicitation by Attorneys

Make Sense?, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 329, 336 (1993) (explaining
that the Court denied solicitation First Amendment protection because, unlike
advertising, in-person solicitation created an enhanced opportunity for an attorney's strategic or manipulative behavior).
96. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951) (describing
solicitation as a "misuse of the great guarantees of free speech," even in the
context of a salesman soliciting door to door, selling magazine subscriptions);
Virginia State Bd. ofPharmacy,425 U.S. at 773 n.25 (acknowledging the "en-
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addressed the issue in Ohralikv. Ohio State BarAss'n, 97 and in In re
Primus.9s When the Court finally characterized the nature of attor-

ney solicitation, it described it as a "business transaction in which
speech is an essential but subordinate component." 99 The Court's
articulation signified that it regarded attorney solicitation as a form
of speech undeserving of the same protection it afforded other forms
of commercial speech. Although the Court previously invoked a
balancing test of sorts in analyzing other commercial speech cases, 00
the Court seemed to abandon this approach when it was forced to
circumscribe the boundaries of permissible attorney in-person solicitation. 1' 1 Instead of a0balancing
test, the Court opted for a lower
2
level ofjudicial scrutiny.1
In explaining this standard of judicial scrutiny, the Court articulated the following rationale upon which it based its analysis: "The
Rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm before it occurs .... [They seek] to
discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences the

State seeks to avert."' °3 This rationale contains two components: a
subjective and an objective component. The first component, as in10 4
dicated by the terms "soliciting employment for pecuniary gain,"'
refers to an analysis of subjective factors, namely the attorney's motive for soliciting. This factor is codified in the language
of Model
10 5
Rule 7.3, and reflected in the rule's legislative history.

hanced possibility for confusion and deception if [attorneys] were to undertake
certain kinds of advertising").
97. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
98. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
99. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 457.
100. See id. at 455 ("The balance struck in Bates does not predetermine the
outcome in this case."); Brandt, supra note 90, at 787-88.
101. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466-67 (discussing how and why the
Court condoned Ohio's prophylactic solicitation rule).
102. See id. at 457.
103. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. See REICH, supra note 80, at 183-86.
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The Court also employed a second component in its analysisone which was not codified in Model Rule 7.3, nor discussed in its
legislative history. 0 6 The second component, as illustrated by the
phrase "under circumstances likely to result in adverse consequences,"' 0 7 refers to an analysis of objective factors, namely the circumstances surrounding the actual solicitation. Together, these factors provided the Court with both the means and the tools with which
to determine whether an attorney solicitation was permissible. 08
2. Ohralikand Primus are put to the test
The Court utilized this two-part approach in its simultaneous yet
seemingly dichotomous decisions dealing with attorney solicitation
cases. In Ohralik, the Supreme Court confronted a classic case of
ambulance chasing. Albert Ohralik, a licensed attorney, learned of
an auto accident involving two young women, Carol McClintock and
Wanda Lou Holbert. 10 9 Oh ralik twice approached McClintock at her

hospital bed, offering to represent her in suing for personal injury
damages." 0 McClintock finally agreed to Ohralik's representation,
and signed a contingency fee agreement."' Obralik also approached
Holbert at her home the day she returned from the hospital, and
urged her to retain his services." 2 He used a concealed tape recorder
to record and preserve evidence of Holbert's oral assent to the representation. "1 When Holbert and McClintock discharged Ohralik as4
their attorney, he refused to withdraw as the attorney of record."
Consequently, both filed complaints against Ohralik for violations of

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1998).

Ohralik,436 U.S. at 464.
See id.; Primus,436 U.S. at 434.
See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 449.
See id. at450.
See id.
See id. at451.
See id.
See id. at 452.
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the Ohio Code of ProfessionalResponsibility" 5 for engaging in direct in-person solicitation." 6
In reviewing the Ohio Supreme Court's decision, the United
States Supreme Court noted that "[t]he solicitation of business by a
lawyer through direct, in-person communication with the prospective
client ha[d] long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's
ideal of the attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant
potential for harm to the prospective client." ' 7 The Court's two-part
subjective and objective analysis served three important interests:
"[first,] reduc[ing] the likelihood of overreaching... and undue influence on laypersons; [second,] protect[ing] the privacy of [such]
individuals; and [third,]... avoid[ing] situations where the lawyer's
exercise of judgment on behalf
of the client will be clouded by his
8
own pecuniary self-interest."'1
In employing the subjective prong of its analysis, the Court
readily determined that Ohralik was motivated by his own selfish,
pecuniary interests.119 First, Ohralik insisted on a contingency fee
agreement--"thereby tempting the young women with what sounded
like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer.' 20 Second, even after
the two victims rightfully discharged Ohralik, he demanded a share
of their insurance recovery to settle a lawsuit he audaciously filed
against the women for breach of contract.' 2 ' The Court explained
that "impermissible solicitation[s] [are those] undertaken for purposes of the attorney's pecuniary gain and... [do]... not includ[e]
offers of service to indigents without charge.'1 22 Since Ohralik's
conduct was motivated solely by the potential for his own financial
benefit, he engaged in an impermissible solicitation.
115. Ohralik called for an interpretation of Ohio's adaptation of the Model
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. It read in part: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer." Id. at 453 n.9.
116. See id. at 452-53.
117. Id. at454.
118. Id. at461.
119. See id. at 467-68.
120. Id. at 467.
121. See id. at 452.
122. Id. at 462-63 n.20.
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After its subjective analysis of the solicitation, the Court analyzed the objective circumstances surrounding it.123 In fact, the
Court declared that the appropriate focus of its analysis was
Ohralik's conduct, and not his motives.' 24 The circumstances surrounding the solicitation revealed a coercive and overreaching encounter. Ohralik approached McClintock and Holbert immediately
following a car accident which hospitalized both victims. 125 The
Court reasoned that, despite any value it may have in apprising victims of their legal rights, approaching a vulnerable individual is intrusive. 126 The Court recognized that Ohralik's presence prevented
either woman from carefully deliberating and arriving at a wellthought-out decision. 127 In upholding the state's prophylactic ban on
pecuniary-motivated in-person solicitation under such circumstances, 28 the Court concluded that Ohralik's improper motive and
objectively dangerous conduct resulted in an impermissible solicitation-one which the First Amendment would not protect. 129 The
Court's reliance on both objective and subjective factors yielded a
holding which not only upheld a prohibition of pecuniary-motivated
in-person attorney solicitations, but also formulated a new standard
regulating attorney solicitation practices. Therefore, contrary to the
ABA drafters' reading of the holding, the Court actually employed
an analysis containing both subjective and objective components.

123. See id. at 463.
124. See id.; see also Wishcamper, supra note 6, at 676 & n.27 (explaining
that the Court placed its primary focus on the circumstances of the solicitation).
125. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at449.
126. See id. at 465.
127. See id. at 457.
128. The Court refused to require the state to prove actual injury to McClintock and Holbert. See id. at 466-68. It acknowledged that the occurrence of an
in-person solicitation is not likely to be visible to the public-at-large, and consequently goes unwitnessed. See id. at 466. Since it would be difficult to obtain reliable proof that the incident occurred, the Court determined that a prophylactic ban was appropriate in prohibiting all pecuniary-motivated
solicitations that take place under coercive circumstances. See id. at 466-67.
129. See id. at 467-68.
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While the Court employed the identical analysis in In re Primus, 130 a distinct result emerged.13 ' In Primus, ACLU attorney Edna
Smith Primus contacted Mary Etta Williams who had been allegedly
sterilized pursuant to a Medicare policy requiring the sterilization of
all Medicare beneficiaries.132 Upon learning of Williams's alleged
desire to institute a lawsuit, Primus wrote Williams a letter informing
133
her of the ACLU's offer of pro bono representation in the matter.
Rather than filing a lawsuit against the doctor who sterilized her,
Williams instead3 4 filed a complaint with the state bar against Primus
for solicitation.'
With Ohralik before it, the Court could easily distinguish Primus's conduct. The Court's majority first analyzed Primus's subjective motive. 135 Unlike Ohralik's pecuniary motive, 36 the Court
characterized Primus's motive as one of "seeking to further political
and ideological goals through... advis[ing] a lay person of her legal
rights and ...that free legal assistance [was] available ....137 In
fact, the Court heralded Primus's politically-motivated solicitation
rights of others, 38 and not
because such conduct promoted the civil
139
attorney.
the
of
the pecuniary interests
The Court went on to engage in an objective analysis of the na4
ture and circumstances under which the solicitation took place.1 0
The Court first distinguished Oralik's overreaching and intrusive
solicitation from that of Primus's by noting the manner in which
the solicitation occurred.' 4 1 The solicitation in Primus did not take
place under conditions which placed Williams in a vulnerable or
130. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
131. See id. at 422. Interestingly enough, though surely not a coincidence,
the Court decided Ohralik and Primus on the very same day. See id. at 412;
Ohralik,436 U.S. at 447.
132. See Primus,436 U.S. at 416-17.
133. See id. at416.
134. See id. at 417.
135. See id. at 422.

136. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 467.
137. Primus,436 U.S. at 414.

138. See id. at 422.
139. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
140. SeePrimus,436 U.S. at422.
141. See id.
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compromising position.' 42 Primus sent Williams a letter following
an initial, informal meeting by the parties. The letter was not misleading, and unlike a direct, face-to-face meeting, it did not present
the same risks of overreaching that existed in Ohralik.'43 The letter
merely contained pertinent information which informed Ms. Williams in a non-coercive manner about her rights and about the lawsuit.' 44 Moreover, the act of sending it would allow her to have time
and space to deliberate and arrive at a well-reasoned decision regarding her involvement. 4 5 Therefore, by applying a subjective and
objective analysis, the Court found Primus's solicitation to be permissible. It lacked the impermissible motive and circumstances
which would otherwise condemn such behavior. 46
Together,
Ohralikand Primus established the two poles of permissible and impermissible attorney solicitations' 47 determined by both a subjective
and objective analysis.
While the majority opinions in each case relied quite heavily on
an objective analysis, the true importance of employing an objective
analysis is better discussed in the cases' minority opinions. Both
Justice Marshall's concurrence in Ohralik14' and Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in In re Primus14 9 focus-in varying degrees-on the significance of the objective component of the Court's analysis. Although
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority's holding in condemning
142. See id. at 435.
143. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at468.
144. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 416-17 n.6. The relevant portion of the letter
read:
The American Civil Liberties Union would like to file a lawsuit on
your behalf for money against the doctor who performed the operation
.... [We] would like to explain what is involved so you can understand what is going on .... [I]f you are interested, let me know, and
I'll let you know when we will come down to talk to you about it.
Id. at 416 n.6.
145. See id. at 435.
146. See id. at 422.
147. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Our holdings today deal... with situations at opposite poles of the problem of attorney solicitation.").
148. See id. at 468-77 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment).

149. See Primus,436 U.S. at 440-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Ohralik's conduct, his concurrence argued that "[w]hat is objectionable about Ohralik's behavior here is not so much that he solicited
business for himself, but rather the circumstances in which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished
it."15 Justice Marshall contended that an emphasis on the objective
circumstances under which a solicitation occurred would promote
what he deemed to be "'benign' solicitations"' 5' or in other words,
solicitation by advice and information that is truthful and
that is presented in a non-coercive, nondeceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotionally and
physically capable of making a rational decision either to

respect to a legal
accept or reject the representation 1with
52
claim or matter that is not frivolous.
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist noted the importance of considering
objective factors. 153 Unlike Justice Marshall, however, Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with the majority opinions in both Primus and
Ohralik154 Justice Rehnquist instead endorsed the use of a purely
objective test to assess an attorney's conduct.' 55 Justice Rehnquist

emphasized that to condemn Ohralik's pecuniary solicitation, while
150. Ohralik,436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
151. Id. at 472 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
152. Id. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); cf Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 139 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky.
1940) (stating that an "attorney may personally solicit business... where he
does not take advantage of the ignorance, or weakness, or suffering, or human
frailties of the expected clients, and where no inducements are offered...
153. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
154. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In discussing the Court's holdings in
Ohralikand Primus,Justice Rehnquist sardonically remarked that:
One tale ends happily for the lawyer and one does not. If we were
given the latitude of novelists in deciding between happy and unhappy
endings for the heroes and villains of our tales, I might well join in the
Court's disposition of both cases ....

But I remain unpersuaded by

the Court's opinions in these two cases that there is a principled basis
for concluding that the First... Amendment[] forbid[s] South Carolina from disciplining Primus here, but permit[s] Ohio to discipline
Ohralik in the companion case.
Id. at 440-41.
155. See id. at 443 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
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permitting Primus's politically-motivated one, was unjustified.156 He
further argued that
to the extent [the analysis] focuses upon the motive of the
speaker, it is subject to [the] manipulation [of] . . . clever
practitioners .... And we may be sure that the next lawyer

in Ohralik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct
will come here cloaked in the prescribed mantle of 'politi57
cal association' to assure [that his conduct is upheld].
Consequently, Justice Rehnquist urged the Court to adopt a purely
objective standard because the "danger of

. .

. [adverse] conse-

quences is [not] minimized simply because a lawyer proceeds from
political conviction rather than for pecuniary gain."' 58
An objective standard is a more effective measure of appropriate
conduct. Since a state can more readily regulate objective conduct,
as opposed to the motives underlying it,' 59 consistent outcomes are
more likely to result. More specifically, "the difficulty of drawing
distinctions on the basis of ...

the motive ...

is a valid reason for

avoiding the undertaking where a more objective standard is readily
available."' 160 Accordingly, the heavy emphasis on an objective
standard in both the majority and minority opinions suggests that the
Ethics 2000 Committee should revamp Model Rule 7.3 to include an
objective component.
on Objective
C. The Minority Becomes the Majority: Relying
16 1

Factorsin Edenfield v. Fane
While the circumstances and nature of the solicitation played a
significant role in shaping the holdings of both Ohralik and Primus,
156. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 445 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Hill, supra note 5, at 416
(indicating that a motive test is ineffective because seeking political gain, favor, or publicity could also reap indirect pecuniary benefits).
159. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
"inquiry must focus on the character of the conduct which the State seeks to
regulate... [as] [t]he State is empowered to discipline for conduct which it
deems detrimental to the public interest...

160. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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the Court's holding in Edenfield v. Fane,decided over a decade after
Ohralik, further revealed the necessity and validity of an objective
analysis. In Edenfield, Scott Fane, a certified public accountant,
challenged the Florida Board of Accountancy Administration's rule
prohibiting certified public accountants from engaging in any uninvited, direct solicitation for business purposes. 62 Fane, who had recently moved to Florida, sought to utilize telephone and in-person
solicitations to develop his client base and generate business.1 3 In
challenging the Florida ban on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, Fane argued that solicitation was protected commercial
speech.'6
Despite the Court's holding in Ohralik,which condemned pecuniary-motivated attorney solicitations, the Court struck down the
Florida ban.' 65 The Court declared, contrary to its rationale in
Ohralik, that solicitation "is commercial expression to which the
protections of the First Amendment apply.' 166 While this pronouncement seemingly contradicted the Court's previous declaration
in Ohralik,167 the Court reiterated the importance of an objective
analysis in assessing the permissibility of a solicitation. 68 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that Ohralik did not
stand for the proposition that "all personal solicitation is without
First Amendment protection (citation omitted) ....

There are, no

doubt, detrimental aspects to personal commercial solicitation in
certain circumstances ... ,,169 In distinguishing Ohralikfrom Edenfield, where both professionals possessed pecuniary motivations, the
Edenfield Court employed only an objective analysis 170 in upholding
162. See id. at763.
163. See id. at 763-65.
164. See id. at 764-65.
165. See id. at 763.
166. Id. at 765.
167. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 457.
168. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774-75; see also Brandt, supra note 90, at
809 (arguing that objective factors will enhance the effectiveness of a solicitation rule).
169. Edenfleld, 507 U.S. at 765.
170. Some may argue that the Court was forced to employ an objective
analysis in order to successfully distinguish Edenfield from Ohralik, because
both professionals shared the same pecuniary motive for soliciting their respective clients. While this theory could undermine the Court's approach in
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the accountant's solicitation in the latter case. 17 1 This is exemplified
by Kennedy's statement that the circumstances in Edenfield "are not
so inherent or ubiquitous that solicitation of172this sort is removed from
the ambit of First Amendment protection.'

Accordingly, in affording First Amendment protection to accountant's solicitations under the commercial speech doctrine, the
Court first determined that the solicitation survived the scrutiny imposed by the newly-created, four-part CentralHudson test.173 However, apart from the constitutional analysis, the Court sought to further distinguish Ohralik from Edenfield. It did so by invoking an
objective analysis. First, the Court distinguished Edenfield based on
the nature of the solicitation, as well as on the skills and training in
the art of persuasion possessed by the professional involved.' 74 The
Edenfield, it would only truly undermine it if the Court had relied solely on a
subjective analysis in Ohralik, and employed only an objective analysis to dis-

tinguish Fane's conduct. But since the Court relied on both subjective, and arguably more heavily on objective criteria in rendering its respective opinions,
this is not likely the case.
171. Justice O'Connor's dissent noted the Court's difficulty in viably distinguishing these two cases. O'Connor failed to see how professional distinctions
alone could produce inconsistent results in these two cases. See Edenfield, 507
U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She argued that since all professionals
receive specialized training, accountants are just as likely to use their training
and expertise to mislead or coerce naive prospective clients as an attorney
might be inclined to. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In sum, she did not
believe that, constitutionally, these cases warranted different outcomes. See id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 766.
173. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). This case, decided after the attorney solicitation cases, replaced the previous balancing test with a more formal, fourpart analysis: whether (1) the speech was lawful and not misleading; (2) the
state's interests in proscribing speech were substantial; (3) the challenged
regulation advanced these interests in a direct and material way; and (4) the
extent of the restriction on protected speech was reasonably related to the interests served. See id. at 566. The Edenfield Court held that the first three
prongs of the Central Hudson test were satisfied, and upheld the speech without reaching the fourth prong of the analysis. See Edenfield, 507 U.S.. at 767;
L. Kyle Heffley, Commercial Speech Face-to-Face Solicitation by Certified
Public Accountants (But Not Attorneys?) Is Protected Speech Under the First
Amendment, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 683, 694-95 (1994) (discussing the

Court's holding and expounding on the reasoning behind it).

174. See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 774. But see Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 779-80
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potential for manipulation and overreaching is greater when an attorney, professionally trained in the art of persuasion, solicits a client in
a face-to-face encounter.175 In contrast, accountants receive "training
176
[which] emphasizes independence and objectivity, not advocacy.'
The Court made an additional distinction relating to the degree
of susceptibility of the client. Attorneys who are inclined to solicit
business tend to solicit clients who are either indigent or vulnerable,

and desperate for legal assistance, as the victims arguably were in
Ohralik.177 On the other hand, the Court characterized the "typical

client of a CPA [to be] far less susceptible to manipulation... [because] prospective clients are sophisticated and experienced business
17
executives who understand the services that a CPA offers."'

Finally, the Court distinguished accountant solicitations from
attorney solicitations based on their respective nature. The Court
condemned attorney solicitation on the basis that it unduly pressures
and often coerces a client into accepting representation without
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that distinctions drawn based on the profession of the solicitor should not be sustained).
175. See id. at 775; see also Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1521 (11th
Cir. 1991) (Edmondson, J., dissenting). Edmondson believed that the potential
for abuse stemmed from an attorney's "specialized knowledge beyond that of
their solicited clients." Id. Moreover,
[t]his special leverage, or ability to pressure others.., is not so much
a function of their oratory skill; instead, it stems from the gap in
knowledge between the professional and the lay person ....The danger lies with the lawyer who intimidates or baits the potential client
with the lawyer's specialized knowledge while simultaneously preying
on the client's relative ignorance.
Id. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 90, at 804 (expounding on Judge Edmondson's dissent, and arguing that, while lawyers are specifically trained to serve
as advocates, few are actually involved in litigation or advocacy in their respective practices).
176. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775; see also Heffley, supra note 173, at 698-99
(attributing the holding to professional distinctions). But see Fane, 945 F.2d at
1521 (Edmondson, J., dissenting) (arguing that professional distinctions are not
a sound basis for distinguishing attorney from accountant solicitations because
CPAs have the same capacity and specialized knowledge as do attorneys to
entice, coerce, or intimidate potential clients).
177. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 449-51.
178. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775. But see Brandt, supra note 90, at 805
(questioning whether or not potential clients of CPA's are truly experienced
and sophisticated).
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179
affording the client adequate time to make a rational decision.
Conversely, accountants are likely to solicit clients by '"meet[ing]
[them] in their own offices at a time of [the client's] choosing."' 18
Such an environment is "conducive to rational and considered decisionmaking by the prospective client, in sharp contrast to the 'uninformed acquiescence' to which the accident victims in Ohralik were
prone.",'8' Moreover, an informal office meeting does not pressure
the potential client, nor does it create an expectation that the client
must retain the accountant then and there. 182 Thus, the emphasis the
Court placed on objective factors in assessing the permissibility of a
solicitation, whether it be in the attorney or accountant context, exemplifies the need for the incorporation of an objective analysis in
Model Rule 7.3.

V. PUBLiC PoucY RATIONALES
Apart from the justifications and rationales offered by the Supreme Court in the attorney and accountant solicitation cases, a rule
that incorporates both an objective and subjective component would
better serve public policy interests. Specifically, because this twoprong test seeks to prevent pecuniary-motivated solicitations that occur in overbearing and oppressive circumstances, the adoption of
such a test would effectively eliminate the dangerous type of solicitation seen in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. 83 Further, such a
rule would also permit solicitations to occur under benign circumstances that seek to promote civil rights or the public interest as seen
in In re Primus. 84 This sort of benign solicitation' 85 serves to
promote two public policy interests: first, it encourages philanthropic work and community outreach in making legal services more

179.
180.
181.
182.

See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 457.
Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 776.
Id. at 775.
See id. at 776; see also Brandt, supra note 90, at 805-06 (explaining the

limitations on the Court's rationale).
183. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
184. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
185. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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to dispel the poor image of attoraccessible; 86 and second, it helps
1 87
neys as greedy professionals.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 insinuates
that attorneys possess an affirmative duty, by virtue of their profession, to make legal counsel available both to indigents and to the
community at large.' 88 In promoting philanthropic behavior, the Bar
seeks to "assure the maximum amount of useful information to the
public with the minimum amount of potential harm."' 89 According
to the Preliminary Report of a National Survey by the Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs of the American Bar Association,
thirty-three percent of respondents had never consulted a lawyer,
while another twenty percent of those surveyed had given serious
thought to consulting a lawyer, but failed to do so. 190 The ABA
study further revealed that one of the most common reasons laypeople do not seek out attorneys is because they do not know where or
how to find competent legal assistance. '9' Moreover, the same study
186. See id. at 470-71 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Marshall reminded the Court that attorneys possess both a
responsibility to perform pro bono work and a "responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay ....
" Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Moreover, he urged, "[E]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should... participate in serving the disadvantaged." Id. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
187. See id. at 471-72 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).

188. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1998); see
also FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 118 (discussing the legal profession's duty to
make legal counsel available to the public). See generally Wilbur, supra note
6 (discussing the scope of an attorney's affirmative duty to provide legal services to those in need of representation). Recall that the Supreme Court heraided the pro bono solicitation of attorney Primus in In re Primus for her selfless efforts to advance the civil liberties of the client. See Primus, 436 U.S. at
422.
189. LORI B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING

AND SOLICITATION 86 (1980).
190. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & FRANCIS 0. SPALDING, PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SURVEY

LEGAL NEEDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION 85-86 (1980).

191. See id.at 94-95 tbl. 7.1 (reporting that 48.3% of those surveyed strongly
agreed that a lot of people do not obtain counsel because they do not know

who to retain, or whether the person is competent to represent them).
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indicated that 56.8% of those surveyed agreed that the legal system
favored the rich and powerful at the expense of the lower and middle
classes. 192 Yet 69.8% of respondents also believed that the legal
system can effectively contend with the problems of laypeople, and
not solely those of the wealthy. 193 Collectively, these conflicting responses indicate that laypeople
perceive the legal system as inacces1 94
them.
to
unavailable
or
sible
The Supreme Court recognized the ever-growing need to make
legal services known 95 and available to disadvantaged individuals. 196 In response, the Bar hoped to make legal services available
192. See id. at 95.
193. See id.

194. Likewise, the Supreme Court even recognized that the absence of
commercial speech results in public disillusionment with the profession:
The absence of [commercial speech] . . .reflect[s] the profession's

failure to reach out and serve the community: Studies reveal that
many persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need
because... of an inability to locate a competent attorney ....[T]he
profession... condon[es] the actions of [an] attorney who structures
his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential
clients.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 370-71 (1977).
195. The Court admitted that, while there is a need to make legal services
available, a stigma associated with legal commercial speech exists because attorney advertising and solicitation appears unprofessional. See id. The Court
emphasize[d] the need for information that will assist persons desiring
legal services to choose lawyers ....[While] advertising is the most

commonly used and useful means of providing information as to
goods and other services ...it generally has not been used with respect to legal ...services ...[because it] ... would tend to mislead

rather than inform.
Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite this
need, the Court limited its holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, and failed
to automatically afford in-person solicitation the same protection that the Court
afforded to pharmacists engaged in commercial speech. See id. at 366 n.17.
196. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The Court hailed attorney Primus for "communicating an offer of free assistance by attorneys ...to advance the civil-libert[y]
objectives" of Williams, a disadvantaged client--speech "protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments." Primus,436 U.S. at 422. The Court went
on to say that "The First and the Fourteenth Amendments require a measure of
protection for... 'advising another that his legal rights have been infringed."'
Id. at 432 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)).
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through the implementation of programs and services such as group
legal service plans, lawyer referral programs, bar-sponsored legal
clinics, and public service law firms.197 Nonetheless, the "profession
recognizes that less success has been achieved in assuring that persons who can afford to pay modest fees have access to lawyers competent and willing to represent theni"' 198 This problem is most
prominent in large, diverse metropolitan communities where the legal community is more isolated.' 99 Unless the legal community can
reach out to middle and lower-class populations, "consumers will be
forced to select legal representation on the basis of haphazard and
often irrelevant criteria., 20 0 Hence, a rule allowing for benign solicitations would encourage attorneys to reach out to make their legal
services known and available to those in need.
Not only does a benign solicitation rule increase the availability
of legal services, but it also provides attorneys with actual opportunities to educate the public about their legal rights. 201 The American
BarAssociation Journalrecently reported that the ban on solicitation
not only makes it more difficult for low-income individuals to learn
about their legal rights, but it unfairly provides insurance company
defendants with an easy opportunity to settle claims quickly and
cheaply. 20 2 If individuals are ignorant of their legal rights and remedies, victims are deprived of the justice they deserve.
Furthermore, a Model Rule permitting benign solicitations
would improve the image of legal professionals. By encouraging the
performance of at least fifty hours of yearly pro bono legal services, 20 3 the ABA hopes that attorneys will reach out to their local
communities, and educate citizens about their legal rights and avail-

able services.20 4 Moreover, the ABA hopes that this involvement
197. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 398; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 473-75 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
198. Bates, 433 U.S. at 398.
199. See Maute, supra note 88, at 533.
200. Id. (citing B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES 1826

(1970)).
201. See id. at 532-33.
202. See Michael Higgins, A New Attitude, 83 A.B.A. J. 27, 27 (1997).
203. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1998).
204. See id. Rule 6.1 ct(1).
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will provide attorneys with opportunities to fulfill their professional
and community responsibilities in championing the causes of the dis2 °5 If attorneys fail to perform pro bono work, a modem
advantaged.
version of the medieval idea "that... courts ought to exist only for
those sufficiently aggrieved to pursue their remedies ' 20 6 will manifest itself. Interjecting this notion into social thought will produce a
result whereby 'the wealthy, knowledgeable, and aggressive are favored over the poor, ignorant and timid. 20 7 By allowing benign solicitations, not only can attorneys offer immediate assistance to clients, but they can work to improve their professional image.
Finally, while the Model Rules lay a foundation for basic ethical
concerns that should guide attorneys in their practice, they exemplify
only a framework of bare minimum standards for ethical behavior:
"the [Model] Rules, do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human
activity can be completely defined by legal rules ....[They] simply
provide a framework for the ethical practice of law., 20 8 It is imperative that attorneys realize the limitations inherent within the Rules
because "a professional ideal contains explicitly moral features [but]
does not even guarantee that the realization of that ideal is compatible with living a morally acceptable life. [There is no]
guarantee that
20 9
a good lawyer will be or even can be a good person.,
Lawyers should remember that apart from their professional
lives, they too are people-much like the clients they represent. They
should hold fast to personal morals and common sense notions of
justice to guide their professional actions and decisions. Due to the
inherent limitations imposed by the ethics rules, however, while certain behavior may conform to an individual's personal ethics or morals, it may offend those set forth in the ethics rules or statutes. In
other words, irrespective of whether it is permissible under the

205. See id.
206. Gipson, supra note 44, at 1189.
207. Id.

208. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope 14 (1998).
209. Susan Wolf Ethics, Legal Ethics, and the Ethics of Law, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 38, 51 (David Luban ed.,
1983).
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parameters of Model Rule 7.3, many attorneys would nonetheless offer to assist a pro se individual out of sympathy, perhaps empathy, or
because their individual morals dictate it. A rule employing both an
objective and a subjective analysis would not only condone these interactions, but facilitate them. It would also allow attorneys who
subscribe to a higher
set of individual moral standards to act in ac210°
cordance with them
VI. CONCLUSION

Model Rule 7.3 is only partially successful in enacting an ethics
rule regarding attorney solicitation that is not only consistent with,
but reflective of, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In articulating
the standard for evaluating attorney solicitations, the Court stated
that the rule was intended to "discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in
the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert.",21 However, the
"pecuniary motive" language of Model Rule 7.3 adopts only a subjective analysis. In disregarding the objective analysis, the drafters
crafted a rule that is difficult to apply212 because it is "subject to manipulation by clever practitioners., 213 Practically speaking, a purely
subjective rule proves to be ineffective in addressing all of the
"evils" inherent in attorney solicitation. 14 In fact, the modern trend,
as reflected by the Court's opinion in Edenfield v. Fane,1 5 seems to
advocate the use of objective factors. Whether Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Primus influenced other members of the Court or whether
they acted of their own accord, the Court employed a purely objective analysis in Edenfield.1 6 In doing so, the Court communicated
the importance of evaluating the circumstances surrounding a solicitation to better assess its viability.

210. See generally id. (reconciling professional responsibility with personal

morals).
211. Ohralikv. Ohio StateBarAss'n, 436 U.S. 447,464 (1978).
212. See Wishcamper, supra note 6, at 680.
213. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 442 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214. See Wishcamper, supra note 6, at 680.
215. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
216. See id. at 775-76.
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More importantly, however, public policy concerns mandate the
incorporation of an objective component. Because a two-pronged
test can more effectively address both the subjective and objective
evils that plague attorney solicitations, it will successfully weed out
inherently dangerous solicitations, while permitting benign solicitations to occur. As Justice Marshall argued, attorneys have a duty to
serve and represent the disadvantaged.2 17 As attorney Solomon Cohn
did in the opening scenario, 18 one way of providing legal services to
indigent clients with important personal or public issues is through
happenstance meetings and subsequent offering of services. A rule
that permits these benign solicitations-solicitations free of pecuniary motives and coercive circumstances-not only promotes philanthropy among attorneys and improves their reputation, but it helps
return accountability to the justice system. Without some form of
safe attorney solicitation, the justice system will continue to anonymously victimize innocent pro se clients who simply are ill-equipped
to tackle the system
The Ethics 2000 Committee of the American Bar Association
should revamp Model Rule 7.3 and formulate a rule that eliminates
the dangers associated with solicitation. Such a rule would better
serve and protect pro se and indigent clients. Furthermore, it will
help restore accountability to the legal system and the legal profession to its roots-where attorneys are individuals willing to devote
their time, energy, and a piece of themselves to serving others.
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217. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 471 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
218. See supra Part I.
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